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GREEN THE UNION: AN INVESTMENT STRATEGY TOWARDS 
A SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN UNION
Restoring economic growth in Europe using only monetary policy, even of
the unconventional variety, appears more and more insufficient and in desperate
need of a second or third leg. In a much debated speech at Jackson’s Hole this
summer, Mario Draghi recalled this difficult context in the fight against the risk
of stagnation.
Structural reforms are often presented as a suitable complementary policy
tool. However, aside from the vagueness of their content, they could prove reces-
sionary, deflationary, and costly in the short term, procuring benefits in terms of
potential growth in the long or medium term only. Even though some structural
reforms may have positive impacts on activity or prices in the short term, recent
experiences, conducted in periods of large negative output gaps, tend to confirm
the general intuition that positive impacts may be long to manifest (see
Chapter 1). 
Fiscal policy could also be used as a complement. However, the governance
of the euro area, notably the reinforced framework of the growth and stability
pact (TSCG, 6-pack and 2-pack), combined with the continued weakness of Euro
area economies burdened by high cyclical deficits, have maintained restrictive
fiscal policies across the Euro area. The euro area as a whole has now suffered
from a cumulated fiscal impulse of more than negative 5 GDP points since 2010,
explaining in part the double dip recession of the euro area starting in 2011. It
remains important to salvage the heritage from the painful process of fiscal
governance building in Europe, even if the current governance presents many
flaws. In particular, when faced with a need for investment known to have a high
social return because of climate change, the Euro area’s fiscal governance still calls
for consolidation despite enjoying very low sovereign rates.
Characteristically, one of the key aspects of the European economic malaise is
the dramatic drop in physical investment since the onset of the crisis. Unlike other
countries such as the US, investments in the euro area have not yet begun to
recover (see Figure 1).
This situation is both a reflection of the current European macroeconomic
context, and a cause for the continued sluggishness of economic activity in the
Euro area. Worse, low investment threatens the long-term ability of the European
economy to develop and service individual and social needs.
In reaction to this deadlock, dissenting voices are now defending that the
European Union needs an immediate yet sustained boost in investment, to avoid
deflation in the short-term, and to prepare for the future and improve its sustaina-
bility in the long term. This is the proclaimed goal of the “€300 billion investment
plan” recently announced by the European Commission’s newly elected presi-
dent, Jean-Claude Juncker. The current proposal does not go nearly far enough
though—the expected multiplier of 15:1 between private and public investments
underlines the utter lack of fresh public funding committed to the plan. The ability
of the new European Fund for Strategic Investments to mobilise hundreds of
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billions of private money over three years with €21 billion of (mostly recycled) EU
public money can be questioned. Worse still, the Juncker plan has not clearly
determined its target sectors and the projects it could potentially fund. It has not
identified either the channels through which the projected increase in investments
will be financed, or the ways in which it could be sustained in the medium to long
term (see Chapter 1).
A European investment plan should strive to maximize both its short-term
impact on activity and its long-term effects on the sustainability of future Euro-
pean growth—particularly regarding official EU policy goals such as the 20-20-20
objective.1 This entails that investment in business-as-usual, unsustainable
“brown” infrastructure should be avoided, as it maintains the European economy
on a development pathway that grows harder to reverse the later the transition
towards sustainability begins. This irreversibility of infrastructure investment
makes energy a high priority sector.
This paper identifies three sectors that fulfil the double criteria of short-term
boost to growth and long-term sustainability: energy production and distribution,
energy retrofit in the building sector, and sustainable mobility. For each of them,
we will discuss the macroeconomic interest of investing in their transformation, as
well as the capacity of the EU to stimulate and maintain an increase in invest-
ments: does the EU has the financial institutions and instruments to stimulate tens
or even hundreds of billions of investments in these sectors in the short term, for
example in the coming three years, and at the same time how could the EU
ensure the stimulus in investments will continue over decades?
It is worth noting here that, when studying the financial capacity of the EU to
increase investments, the public-private debate pops up: how much of the invest-
ments should be public, how much should be private, what is the leverage effect
Figure 1. Investment in the USA and the Eurozone
In % of GDP
Source: OECD, EO96, December 2014.
1. European 2020 Climate and Energy Package, setting a target of a 20% reduction in EU
greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, an increase in the share of EU energy consumption from
renewable sources to 20% and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency.
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expected? We consider this discussion important, but think it is more relevant to
base the analysis on sector specific studies and determine—from the ground up—
what needs to be public money and what can be private money. More generally,
we think that analysing the sectorial needs for investment is a better starting point
to design an investment strategy than the source of financing or the relevant insti-
tutions and instruments to be used by the plan.
Beyond sector-specific analysis, it should be noted that in order to stimulate
investments in the short and in the long run, it is not enough to inject public
money and attempt to achieve the strongest leverage possible on private invest-
ments. In addition to the push strategy (introducing fresh money into an adapted
financial pipeline), any European investment strategy should adopt a complemen-
tary pull strategy (attracting financing out of the pipeline). 
By modifying the relative prices of different sources of energy, putting in place
a carbon price can spur an increase in investment through the depreciation of
existing energy- and carbon-intensive capital and an improvement in the profita-
bility of, and therefore the demand for, the projects analysed in Section 1. This
paper supports the idea of a “Carbon fiscal shock”, whereby this effect on invest-
ment would be maximised by setting the carbon price at a relatively high level
instantly, instead of following a more traditional progressive increase over time.
Section 2 presents this proposal, which could secure increased investments in
the long run and strongly reduce the current European output gap. It discusses
the conditions under which such a scheme could be implemented in Europe,
notably in terms of compensation and border tax adjustments. The macroeco-
nomic impacts of an EU-wide “Carbon fiscal shock” are then analysed through the
results of simulation exercises using the ThreeME and E3ME models.
1. Where to invest and how to invest?
Given the double criteria of a short-term boost to economic activity and a
long-term improvement of the sustainability of European economic growth, an EU
investment strategy should:
— Put energy supply and energy efficiency in buildings and transport at its
core, as these sectors are key for a sustainable economy and tend to have
strong macroeconomic benefits (growth, jobs, trade and economic
resilience);
— Build on the existing EU financial institutions and instruments to effectively
deliver a short term boost in investment, and progressively adapt them to
ensure this boost is sustained in the longer term.
This section investigates three sectors: energy supply, energy efficient build-
ings and energy efficient mobility. For each of them we identify the current
investment gap and then discuss the short and long-term macroeconomic bene-
fits of closing this gap for the European economy, distinguishing between:
— The growth impact
— The employment impact
— The trade impact 
— The resilience impact. 
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Then we present the financial institutions and instruments the EU has at its
disposal to boost investment in these sectors. We also discuss whether there is a
need for complementary instruments for the EU to effectively support higher
investments in the short and in the long term.
From a general perspective, investing in mobility, housing and energy sectors
is key to build an Energy Union that is much less dependent on costly energy
imports, more resilient to energy price shocks and at the forefront of the fight
against climate change on the road to the Paris Climate Summit in December
2015. Moreover, these sectors are labour-intensive and support the activity mostly
in the construction sector—building construction and civil engineering—where
the output gap remains wide: the activity in 2013 was still below the 1996 level.2
With a longer term perspective, it turns that the energy and climate transition
entails costs that are outweighed by savings: according to the European Commis-
sion Energy Roadmap 2050, the additional capital cost of a decarbonisation
pathway for the EU energy system is below €260 billion annually, whereas savings
are above €310 billion.
Energy production and distribution
Why investing? 
Investment gap. Improving European energy security, particularly in the face
of heightened tensions with Russia, and fulfilling the EU energy and climate objec-
tives for 2020 and beyond require large scale investments in the European energy
production and distribution infrastructure. 
Concerning the energy grid, the European Commission has been identifying
since 2006 a number of Projects of Common Interests grouped under the TEN-E
(Trans-European Networks – Energy) umbrella. These projects entail3 extending
the European gas pipeline network—notably the strengthening of reverse flow
natural gas transmission capacities, thereby improving Eastern Europe’s
resilience; interconnecting Member States’ electric grids, which will improve the
effectiveness of the internal energy market and allow long-distance
transportation of electricity, in particular when produced from renewable energy
sources; developing “smart grids”, to facilitate the integration of renewable
electricity supply and improve load balancing. The European Commission has
estimated that until over the decade leading to 2020, €70 billion will be needed
for gas pipelines, storage, LNG and reverse flow infrastructure, and €140 billion
for high-voltage electricity transmission systems.4 Compared with the
investments delivered during the past decade, the current decade needs a rise of
investments by respectively 30% and 100% for gas and electricity networks. 
In addition, more than €120 billion have to be invested in additional renew-
able energy supply capacity5 if Europe is to achieve its 2020 target. After
weathering the beginning of the economic crisis fairly well, investments in new
renewable energy production capacity have declined for the second year in a
2. Source: Eurostat.
3. Decision No 1364/2006/EC on Trans-European energy networks, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/energy/internal_energy_market/l27066_en.htm
4. MEMO/11/710, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-710_en.pdf
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row in 2013, suffering a precipitous drop of 41%.6 This leaves ample room for a
quick rebound in the deployment of new renewable energy production capacity
in Europe.
Growth impact. Fulfilling the TEN-E and renewable agenda entails the
completion of large scale infrastructure projects that would provide a Keynesian
boost to the European economy in the short-term. Indeed, such investments
would trigger activity in the civil engineering sector, a sector that has experienced
a steep decline since 2008 and has not recovered yet (Figure 2).
In the longer term, the new gas and electricity infrastructure will improve the
effectiveness of the European energy markets, with a beneficial effect on the level
and stability of energy prices. If investments in renewable energy sources reduce
the European energy trade deficit and protect the European economy from
energy crisis (see below), their impact on long term growth remains uncertain
however as it crucially depends on future fossil fuel prices.
Employment impact. The construction of new energy networks, whether it
be pipelines or high-voltage power lines, would be accomplished by the civil engi-
neering sector, with a relatively high average European labour intensity of 7.7 jobs
5. Estimation made using the Green-X model, developed by the Energy Economics Group (EEG)
at the Vienna University of Technology under the EU research project “Green-X–Deriving optimal
promotion strategies for increasing the share of RES-E in a dynamic European electricity market”.
Initially focused on the electricity sector, this modelling tool, and its database on renewable energy
(RES) potentials and costs, has been extended to incorporate renewable energy technologies within
all energy sectors.
6. This evolution needs to be nuanced by the falling cost of solar components: worldwide, 26%
more solar capacity was installed in 2013 than in 2012 for an investment cost 20% lower. However,
this can only account for part of the steep European decline in renewables investment: from 2011 to
2013, total investment fell from €92 billion to €38 billion. 
Figure 2. Civil engineering activity in the EU27
  Construction activity in the EU27, 2010 = 100
Source: Eurostat.
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per million euro of activity (vs 4 for the manufacturing sector).7 Further, these
infrastructure jobs would be purely European, and could not be off-shored. While
some of the equipment used in the production of renewable energy is manufac-
tured outside the EU, Table 1 shows that most renewable energy sources present
a relatively high labour intensity.
Trade impact. Most of the infrastructure planned in the TEN-E projects, such
as pipelines and high-voltage power lines can be produced within the EU. This is
not the case, however, for all renewable energy supply equipment. Whereas the
EU-27 has a considerable trade deficit with the rest of the world in solar compo-
nents (European Commission, 2014),8 the situation is reversed for the other main
renewable energy source offering a large investment potential, wind power: in
2012, the EU had a trade surplus of more than €2.45 billion with the rest of the
world.9
The risk for an increase in the trade deficit on solar components is dwarfed by
the potential improvement that renewable energy sources promise to bring to the
energy trade deficit. In 2012, EU trade deficit in energy products with the rest of
the world reached €421 billion, or 3.3% of EU GDP10—almost three times as high
as in 2004. The European Commission estimated that in 2010, renewables had
already allowed to avoid €10.2 billion in imported fuel costs for electricity genera-
tion, €12.2 billion for heating and €7.6 billion for transport (Eurobserv’er, 2013). 
Resilience impact. The proposed improvements to the European energy grid,
along with the increased deployment of renewable energy sources, would help
insulate the EU from future energy price or supply shocks. Investing in these
projects would help avoid a repeat of the January 2009 gas crisis, when from 6 to
20 January, the 28.6% of European natural gas consumption that transit through
Ukraine were cut off (European Commission, 2009).
Besides, the expansion of renewable energy generation in Europe is central to
the achievement of Europe’s objectives of greenhouse gas emissions reduction.
Reaching a milestone of 20% renewable energy supply by 2020 is, along with a
7. Source: Eurostat.
Table 1. Direct and indirect jobs supported in the EU in 2012 per million euro 
of turnover, by energy source
Full time equivalents, FTEs
Wind power 8.9 Heat pumps 11.1
Solar power 8.2 Biogas 12.1
Solar thermal 11.5 Biofuels 7.9
Small hydropower 8.1 Geothermal 9.2
Source: The State of Renewable Energies in Europe, Eurobserv’er (2013), iAGS calculations.
8. As noted by the European Commission in a recent report, “the EU-27 has a considerable trade
deficit with the rest of the world in solar components and equipment”, which amounts to €9 billion
in 2012—mostly with China. While still very large, this deficit has been halved since 2010, when it
stood at €21 billion. 
9. Source: Eurostat.
10. Source: Eurostat.
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20% improvement in energy efficiency, the pillar that will allow Europe to succeed
in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2020 from its 1990 level.
How to boost the investment?
State of the art
In order to finance the upgrade of projects targeted by the Transport Euro-
pean Networks in Energy, Transport, and Communications, the European
Commission has set up the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in 2013 by a new
European Regulation.11
In the energy sector, the CEF aims at closing the estimated investment gap of
€60 to €70 billion (European Commission, 2011) in the development of Euro-
pean energy infrastructure. By providing technical assistance, coordination
among member states and co-financing from 10% to a maximum of 50% of a
project’s total costs, the CEF intends to unlock investments that could not have
been made in its absence. In particular, it targets an increase in private funding
by bringing in new classes of investors such as pension and insurance funds
through new innovative instruments such as project bonds initiative. Importantly,
it will also provide grants to enable the funding of projects which, while
providing very strong positive externalities, are not commercially viable in the
current economic environment.
The Connecting Europe Facility complements the existing funding from the
EIB, along with other existing European programs which also participate in cross-
border energy infrastructure, most notably the Cohesion and the Structural
Funds. More generally the CEF seeks to avoid duplicating existing European
instruments, and to integrate and coordinate with existing programs, such as the
Common Strategic Framework or the Partnership Contracts.
On the renewables front, while the bulk of investments are largely carried out
by private banks, public finance institutions are essential in catalysing renewable
energy investments. These institutions mostly offer loans on favourable terms,
guarantees, but also provide equity or grants (Eurobserv’er, 2013). After a
decrease from 2011 to 2012, the EIB stepped up its support for renewables in
Europe to €6.4 billion in 2013, a doubling from the year before. It represents a
major actor in this space, providing a channel through which future renewables
investments can be disbursed.
Issues for today and for the future
To increase investments in energy grid, the EU already has at its disposal the
newly established CEF. This Facility however is under-funded. Indeed, €5.85
billion have been made available for energy infrastructure over the period 2014-
2020 whereas, during its design phase in 2011, the European Commission esti-
mated that “nothing less than €9.1 billion will suffice to make sure that the
infrastructure Europe needs is built in time”. 
Similarly, provided that the EIB financial support is stepped up, existing finan-
cial instruments appear adequate to bring European investments in renewables
11. Regulation of the EP and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting
Europe Facility. Official Journal of the European Union.
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back to their 2010-2011 levels. But the cost of financing renewable energy
projects remains an ongoing concern: perceived risks on the evolution of support
policies, volatility on the energy markets, difficulties in obtaining licenses and
other administrative roadblocks all contribute to increase the cost of financing.
This increased financing cost can have a large impact on the ultimate cost of the
electricity delivered by the renewable energy installation over its lifecycle,
impacting its profitability and competitiveness negatively.12 There clearly is a need
to enhance the link between local projects (generally financed by retail banks) and
the financial market. This intermediation could be facilitated in several ways,
through concessional loans,13 securitization vehicles to improve the refinancing
options for retail banks and potentially guarantee funds to reduce the cost of
capital and facilitate the implication of institutional investors through harmonized
and large-scale products (Ecofys, 2011). 
Energy efficient buildings
Why investing? 
Investment gap. Capturing the full potential of energy efficiency in European
buildings requires financing a large-scale deep renovation of the existing building
stock. Indeed, with a construction rate of around 1% per annum14 and a demoli-
tion rate an order of magnitude lower (Thomsen & Flier, 2009), renewing the
building stock with new, energy efficient constructions cannot be enough. 
The European Commission (2012) estimated that €60 billion would be
needed annually from 2012 to 2020 to conduct a moderately ambitious energy
renovation of the European building stock. Copenhagen Economics (2012) esti-
mated that conducting a deep retrofit of the whole existing stock would require
€78 billion per annum over the same period. It should be noted that only a deep
renovation can capture the full energy efficiency potential without risking
“freezing” part of the savings in place through a partial retrofit15 (IEA, 2013c). 
Growth impact. The buildings construction sector accounted for 5.4% of
EU’s GDP in 2013 (compared with 6.4% in 2008), and has been one of the
hardest hit since the beginning of the economic crisis. European construction
output in 2013 was more than 22% below its level of 2007 and had been falling
for 6 years straight. The construction sector is thus primed for a rapid rebound
given an increase in energy renovation investments. Moreover, it is largely
composed of SMEs, with 61% of output produced by companies of 50 employees
12. According to the IEA, reducing the discount factor (including cost of capital and risk premium)
from 10% to 5% can reduce the levelized cost of electricity generation from highly capital-intensive
assets (such as wind and solar power) by up to 30% over the entire lifetime. Projected costs of
generating electricity, International Energy Agency (2010). See also: Towards triple-A policies, RE-
Shaping project, Ecofys et al. (2011).
13. The German KfW’s concessional loans for renewable projects (with interest rates starting at 1%
for up to 20 years) are generally considered a good example. The preferential interest rate is
achieved through the provision of low-cost finance through international markets and limited public
support to further reduce interest rates.
14. Source: Eurostat.
15. A partial renovation can lead to a suboptimal situation where a full renovation is no longer
possible, thereby locking some of the potential energy savings away. 
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or less,16 which make up one of the main focal point of many European financial
support programs.
On a longer-term perspective, the impact of energy renovation on growth
appears to be very dependent on future fossil fuel prices and on the modalities of
the energy renovation policies implemented. For example, a policy that promotes
deep and “one-shot” energy renovation of buildings at the same time they have
to undergo other renovation operations will be more likely to have a strong bene-
ficial impact.
Employment impact. The high labour intensity of energy renovation, esti-
mated as high as 17 full-time equivalents per million euros invested (IDDRI,
2012), is expected to support a large number of jobs creation.17 Besides, with
12 million less employed in the construction of buildings in 2012 than in 2008,
there is a large pool of unemployed qualified professionals in the sector. 
However, in a longer term, there is a need for some capacity development in
the construction industry to master the necessary skills and techniques—which
requires complementary policies to support the investment effort. Indeed,
deeper renovations require more skilled crews, with deep energy renovations
requiring an estimated 30% professionals among crews, compared with 5% in a
base renovation (Herrero et al., 2011). This increases the level of qualification of
the jobs created.
Trade impact. The European construction sector is almost entirely domestic.
The impact of investments in energy renovation would thus directly benefit the
domestic economy. The situation is comparable regarding construction materials:
with a surplus of €9 billion in 2013, the EU is a net exporter of non-metallic
minerals. Moreover, buildings account for 38% of the total EU natural gas
consumption (IEA, 2013a): energy savings in this sector would thus help reduce
the €72 billion natural gas imports bill. 
Resilience impact. The buildings sector accounts for close to 40% of final
energy consumption in Europe (IEA, 2013d) and has long been identified as the
sector offering the largest energy savings potential. Fraunhofer (2009) estimates
the full energy savings potential at 165 Mtoe when cumulated until 2030.
Further, buildings account for 38% of the total EU gas consumption (IEA, 2013a).
In particular, this proportion reaches close to 50% in most Eastern Member States,
such as Poland, the Slovak Republic or the Czech Republic, which import more
than 90% of their natural gas from Russia (IEA, 2013b). Energy savings in this
sector can therefore play a central role in the reduction of Europe’s gas depend-
ency, particularly towards Russian gas.
How to boost the investment?
State of the art
The buildings sector is highly fragmented: it comprises a large variety of
building types, which serve very different residential and non-residential needs,
16. Source: Eurostat.
17. The reduction of employment in the energy sector following the decrease in energy
consumption is expected to be small compared with the number of jobs creation in the buildings
sector, due to the very low labour intensity of the energy sector—see in particular (Quirion, 2010).
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and its ownership structure is varied and scattered.18 As such, improving the
energy efficiency of the buildings sector combines most of the main barriers tradi-
tionally identified when analysing the lack of investment in energy efficiency (IEA,
2007): the relatively low level of energy expenses in the buildings sector hampers
the effectiveness of price signals, access to capital for energy renovation remains
difficult, the incentives of owners and occupants can prove divergent (principal-
agent problem), and finally, a general lack of awareness on energy efficiency
potential benefits and best practices prevents households and commercial build-
ings owners alike to take action.
These roadblocks pose specific challenges to investment in energy renovation,
and require innovative financing arrangements. The European Union has put in
place a range of programs in the field of energy efficiency, particularly buildings
energy retrofit.
— Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas
(JESSICA). This program makes use of the Structural Funds to develop
financial engineering instruments aimed at “strengthening the urban
dimension in cohesion policy through repayable assistance”. JESSICA
operates through a series of specific funds (872 in 2013) that can offer
revolving equity,19 loans and loan guarantees to local authorities across the
EU, in order to support sustainable urban development—including energy
retrofits. These funds can be supervised by a holding fund handled by a
financial institution, such as the EIB, or directly by a national, regional or
local managing authority. As of December 2013, JESSICA had committed
€591 million for energy efficiency, mostly in the buildings sector, an
increase of 31% over 2012. However, with only 4% of the total
€14.3 billion committed in 2013, energy efficiency investments made
through JESSICA can still grow significantly.
— European Energy Efficiency Fund (EEEF). The EEEF has been put in place
in July 2011 to provide loans, loan guarantees and equity through PPPs
with European municipalities, local and regional authorities, or “private
authorities acting on their behalf”, such as utilities, public transportation
providers, social housing associations, ESCOs. Set up with an initial endow-
ment of €265 million, the EEEF had committed €146 million across
7 projects by the end of 2013, spanning energy efficiency, renewable
energy and clean urban transport. The fund targets projects in the €5 to
50 million range, suitable for the energy retrofit of large buildings or entire
districts.20 This fund could be used as a channel for further financing of
medium—to large-scale energy retrofit projects.
— European Local ENergy Assistance (ELENA). This joint EIB-European
Commission initiative assists local and regional authorities in preparing
18. More than 70% of the EU population owning its dwelling, 18.5% renting at a market price,
and 11% in social housing.
19. It should be noted that even in the case of equity investments, this program does not offer
grants—the equity provided through JESSICA is repayable over time so as to be reinvested in the
future.
20. Examples include the energy retrofit of the Jewish Museum Berlin Foundation, with €1.7 million
invested out of a €3.1 million total, or of the University Hospital S. Orsola Malpighi, with
€31.8 million out of a €41 million total.
Green the Union: An investment strategy towards a sustainable European Union 141
energy efficiency or renewable projects. It is not a financial support
program for investment sensu stricto, since it provides grants covering up to
90% of the preparation costs of an energy efficiency project.21 The role of
ELENA is crucial: given the complexity of existing European financing
mechanisms, assistance is often needed for local authorities to design
eligible project proposals. Indeed, with only €49 million disbursed in tech-
nical assistance, ELENA has enabled more than €1.6 billion of investments,
an “assistance leverage” of more than 32.22 Expanding this type of
program is key to overcome the apparent lack of fundable projects often
underlined by financial institutions such as the EIB (Kollatz, 2014). 
Financing issues for today and for the future
If one remains far from the level of investment needed to conduct a deep
retrofit of the entire European building stock, the EU appears to be well positioned
to boost investments in public buildings and/or large scale commercial buildings
through its existing institutions and instruments. Indeed, boosting investment
requires ensuring: 
— First, financial support for energy renovation is tied to the performance
level of the renovation. Otherwise, there exists a risk of funding partial and
ineffective retrofits that do not capture the full energy savings potential. 
— Second, financial support must be accompanied by supporting policies to
build capacity in the buildings sector to deliver deep energy retrofits. This
entails training programs, information campaigns and technical assistance. 
The EU already is well positioned to help on all these fronts. It can enforce that
its financial arms active in energy renovation, such as the EIB and programs like
JESSICA only provide loans to renovation projects that promise a certain level of
energy savings—similar to what the KfW Energy Efficient Renovation program
offers in Germany. It can greatly expand its technical assistance program, such as
ELENA, and extend their mandate to also cover capacity building beyond the sole
local authorities, and across the buildings industry stakeholders. This two action
points would enhance the sustainability of a short-term boost to energy renova-
tion investment. To enhance it even further, the EU should develop third party
financing building on its experiments with this type of innovative schemes
through the forfeiting loans offered by EEEF to municipalities (Box 1).
However, while existing EU instruments are well adapted to support energy
renovation in public buildings and/or large scale commercial buildings, they fail to
fully support residential renovation. Investments in the latter can be unlocked
through third party financing: the EU can help develop these practices for the resi-
dential sector by supporting national or local energy efficiency institutions in the
Member States, which have the capacity to design and manage energy renova-
tion projects in lieu of the homeowners (see box below).
21. Including program structuring, business plans, energy audits, or tendering procedures and
contracts preparation. It can also fund project implementation units.
22. ELENA – European Local ENergy Assistance, EIB (2013).
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Box 1. Third-party financing 
Third-party financing, where the loan financing an energy retrofit is neither
carried by the occupant nor the owner of the retrofitted building, relieves the
beneficiary from all liquidity constraints. Further, by having companies
conducting the renovation carry part of the financing loan to be repaid
through future energy savings, this kind of scheme ensures that renovation
companies’ incentives are well aligned with the ultimate performance of the
energy retrofit.
The EEEF is already experimenting with this type of financing in the field with
their forfeiting loans, used for the €1.1 million energy renovation of the Univer-
sity of Applied Sciences in Munich.
In this arrangement, the Energy Service COmpany (ESCO) commits to achieve
energy savings for the municipality through an Energy Performance Contract
(EPC) (step 1). This EPC serves as collateral to the loan financing the renovation.
The loan is to be repaid using part of the energy savings. The EEEF then
purchases part (in this example 70%) of the net present value of future munici-
pality payments (step 2), thereby taking on most of the risk on the actual
delivery of the promised energy efficiency improvement. The municipality then
pays back part of its energy savings to both EEEF and the ESCO (steps 3 and 4),
in proportions depending on the split made at step 2 between the two institu-
tions. In such a scheme, the beneficiary does not have to invest capital, carry a
loan, or master the required know-how to supervise an energy renovation.
Everything is handled by third parties, under the supervision of EEEF. 
A similar, broader financing model is being developed at the European Joint
Research Centre (JRC, 2014). It aims at being applicable at a much larger scale,
to enable deep energy retrofit for residential housing.
In this model, an Energy Renovation Agency reporting to the government will
be needed to supervise the entire energy renovation process. When a dwelling
is to be renovated, the Agency sets up a tendering process to be answered by a
cluster of companies that combines all the expertise necessary to successfully
carry out the energy renovation. To finance the renovation, the cluster of
companies takes out a long-term loan that will be reimbursed using future
Figure 3. Example of third-party financing used by EEEF
     Source: EEEF (European Energy Efficiency Fund).
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energy savings. These savings are guaranteed by an energy performance
contracting between the cluster of companies and the dwelling—that is,
companies are responsible for the successful reduction in the energy consump-
tion of the renovated dwelling. It is important to note that just as in the PACE
program, the energy performance contract is tied to the dwelling itself, and is
to be transferred in case of a change in ownership. Finally, to facilitate the
involvement of commercial banks, loans granted to finance energy retrofits
would be guaranteed by an Energy Renovation Guarantee Fund, thereby miti-
gating uncertainties on the actual magnitude of future energy savings.
European funds would be essential in setting up the Guarantee Fund, and
possibly in helping funding or developing the Renovation Agency where
needed. Setting up this type of financing scheme today would establish
sustainable channels through which future European financial support can be
deployed.
Energy efficient mobility
Why investing? 
Investment gap. According to the European Commission (2011), the need
for investment in transport infrastructure development in EU Member States for
the period 2010-2030 has been estimated at over 1.5€ trillion. By 2020, the need
for investment projects of trans-European interest (the Trans-European Network
Transport projects) is about 500€ billion, half of which for what is now called the
“core network” of the EU transport system. The Commission defines the core
network as those projects “that carry the main concentration of trans-national
traffic •ows for both freight and passengers. It will ensure the effective connec-
tivity of the Eastern and Western parts of the Union and of its peripheral regions to
Figure 4. Third-party financing scheme proposal (JRC, 2014)
                 Source: JRC (2014).
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the central ones”. Most projects that constitute the core network are rail and port
infrastructures,23 hence contribute to a more sustainable mobility system.
However, while the need for investment is high, EC’s forecasts point the risk
of a serious financing gap if no vigorous action is taken for attracting investment.
For example, as regards the projects of trans-European interest, forecasts for the
2014-2020 period indicate an investment of 48€ billion per year, 21% lower than
what has been realised for the period 2007-2013. Similar “financing gap”
concerns exist for urban mobility projects as the share of the European population
living in cities—around 70 currently – is still growing and should reach 80% by
2035 according to the United Nations. Funding needs for operational and capital
expenditure may double by 2040 (Booz & Company, 2012) whereas local budget
are under tight constraints.
Growth impact. Transport infrastructure investments trigger economic
activity in the civil engineering sectors where the output gap is wide (see above).
This makes such investments particularly relevant to create a short term stimulus
effect on the economy. To guarantee their longer-term macroeconomic benefits,
infrastructures have to be proved to be evaluated through appropriate market
studies, to demonstrate their socio-economic beneficits. 
Employment impact. Investment in transport infrastructure triggers activity
mainly in the civil engineering sector, where employment is low currently and
where labour intensity is relatively high (see above). Beyond the construction
phase and in a longer-term perspective, it is worth noting that the construction of
trains or tramways is relatively labour intensive when compared with the manu-
facturing sector or, more specifically with the automobile industry (4.7 vs 2.7 jobs
per million euros).24
Trade impact. In the short term, infrastructure development benefit to the EU
domestic economy notably through the construction sector. Beyond the
construction phase, rail infrastructures support mostly the EU economy: as
pointed by the Commission in its White Paper on Transport in 2011, many Euro-
pean companies are world leaders in infrastructure, logistics, traffic management
systems and manufacturing of transport equipment, although this position has
still to be maintained. Moreover, the oil imports savings—that will arise if invest-
ments focus on resource efficient infrastructures in rail and water—are important
and contribute massively to the trade balance.
Resilience impact. Investments in transport infrastructures—once again if
focused on most sustainable transport modes—may increase drastically the
energy security of the EU, as the current mobility relies at 96% on oil and as trans-
port represents around 60% of the European oil consumption. From the climate
perspective, it appears that a quarter of EU greenhouse gases emissions are gener-
ated by the transport sector and that it should cut them by 60% by 2050.
Moreover, the total external cost of transport in urban areas (congestion, air
quality, accidents, noise and CO2) is estimated to be about €230 billion annually
(European Commission, 2013).  
23. Regulation of the EP and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting
Europe Facility. Official Journal of the European Union. 
24. Source: Eurostat.
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How to boost the investment?
State of the art. 
Although the needs for investment are important, the transport sector risks a
financing gap be it for urban or trans-European projects. The main issue here is
that the bulk of investment in transport infrastructures has been and is provided
by the public sector, a public sector under tight fiscal constraints in the aftermath
of the financial crisis. What are the tools the EU has at its disposal in order to
increase investment in transport infrastructures? Both for trans-European projects
and for more local ones, it has a set of institutions and instruments already
in place.
In order to speed up investments in the “core” transport network of the EU,
the already mentioned Connecting Europe Facility has been created in 2013 by a
new European regulation.25 Although dedicated also to digital and energy
networks, the bulk of its financial support goes to transport projects: 26€ billion
for the 2014-2020 period, with a strong emphasis on rail. Coupled with potential
EIB loan, the support from the CEF will take mainly the form of grants, as other-
wise this type of projects of European value added would not be implemented.
Grants may amount from 20 to 50% of the project cost, and up to 85% for
specific projects in Member States eligible for Cohesion fund. European Commis-
sion expectations are to trigger around 120€ billion of investments in transport
infrastructures (European Commission, 2011),26 mostly from the public sector.
Within a context of tight budgetary constraints, the CEF is also expected to
act as a catalyst to attract funding from the private sector. That is why it will build
on the new financial instruments put in place in cooperation with the EIB, such as
the Loan Guarantee Instrument for trans-European transport network projects
(LGTT) or the Project Bond Initiative.27 For transport infrastructure, a market
uptake of 2€ billion is expected by the European Commission (2011) from these
innovative instruments, with an expected multiplier effect of 1:15 to 1:20. The use
of such instruments is supposed to be progressive: it is notably capped to 10% of
the CEF funds until 2015, and this cap may be raised to 20% at a later stage.28 
Beyond the trans-European projects considered by the CEF, there are impor-
tant investment needs in infrastructure for urban mobility. The existing EU
instruments to support these projects are:29
— The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. They are the major financial
instruments in place to support investment in mobility infrastructures. Over
25. Regulation of the EP and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting
Europe Facility. Official Journal of the European Union. 
26. The 32 billion expected for the transport infrastructure sector where supposed to leverage 140
to 150 billion.
27. “The Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative, for which the pilot phase has been launched in 2012,
is envisaged to become the main EU instrument to help the promoters of individual infrastructure
projects attract private sector investors, in particular insurance companies and pension funds. This
initiative will enable the issuance by project companies of long-term well-rated bonds instead of
relying only on bank lending. The participation of the European Commission and the EIB will
mitigate some of the risk associated with a project bond issued to finance a specific project. Member
States, infrastructure managers or companies will therefore be able to access a competitive source of
finance and consequently improve the cost of financing such projects.” CEF Brochure.
28. Communication of the Commission, 7 Jan 2014, on the building of the core transport network.
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a fifth of regional funding is allocated to transport. In addition to the grants
provided by these funds, resources are also available from the EIB and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Booz & Company,
2012). Between 2007 and 2013 however, only 9% of all credits allocated
by the Structural Funds to transport (€82 billion) were dedicated to urban
transport.30 
— The JESSICA programme (see above in the building section). It enables
cities to access private finance for urban regeneration projects, but is
limited to projects that can generate a sufficient commercial return. 
— The JASPERS programme that assists cities in managing delivery of already
funded urban mobility projects. 
Financing issues for today and for the future
Be it through the CEF, the EIB or the Cohesion and Structural Funds, the Euro-
pean Union seems to have the necessary institutions and instruments to increase
investment in transport infrastructures within coming years. The CEF for example
could get more credits: the European Commission had asked for 6 billion more for
transport in its first proposal European Commission (2011). For more local trans-
port projects, the EIB and the Structural and Cohesion Funds could increase their
investment contributions. 
However, the rise in investment will hardly sustain if the investment capacity
of the public sector is not increased. Indeed, if the overall EU financial contribu-
tion could leverage many other investments, these investments are traditionally
mostly being made by the public sector, be it at the national or at a more local
level. It is worth noting that there are new innovative financial instruments trying
to attract private investors, and that there is probably again much room for them
to develop. But talking about transport infrastructures, it is likely that most invest-
ments will have to be made by public investors, and that they will have much
trouble making it as long as these investments are counted as debt.
Beyond the issue of access to funding, the long term improvement of urban
mobility requires a focus of improving the capacity of cities to use funding effec-
tively, plan and implement projects. This could be reinforced through JASPERS for
example that provides technical assistance. Booz & Company (2012) suggests
moreover that there may be a need for « the creation of a new financial instru-
ment to better address the capabilities, capacities and innovation requirements of
local agencies to deliver significant gains in urban mobility outcomes”.
 Cross-sectorial conclusions
The sector analysis above has shown that closing the investment gap in
energy supply, energy efficient buildings and transports may have a number of
macroeconomic benefits, both in the short and in the long term. In particular,
29. We do not mention here the CIVITAS program that “provides funding and technical support for
demonstration, evaluation and implementation of innovative technology led projects, but is focused
on promoting innovation rather than addressing specific needs across Europe”. 
30. Resolution du parlement européen sur un plan d’action sur la mobilité urbaine, 2009. http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2009-0199+0+DOC+
XML+V0//FR#title1
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these sectors prove to be relatively labour-intensive and to support activity in
building construction and civil engineering where the output gap is wide.  
Maybe more original is the fact that the EU appears to have a set of financial
institutions and instruments already in place, and sometimes recently estab-
lished, to effectively boost investment in these sectors. In other words, provided
additional public money is made available, the EU has the ability to trigger a
short term rise in investments in energy supply, buildings and mobility without
having to design and implement new financial tools. For the increase to be
sustained, the EU should ascribe some of this additional funding to its most inno-
vative tools, and develop new ones such as third financing for building
renovation and—most importantly for transport infrastructures—address the
fiscal constraints on public actors. 
2. A “Carbon price shock” to boost investment
Delivering the investments needed for building an Energy Union is not only
about injecting some public money from the EU and MS and try as much as
possible to have a strong leverage effect on private investments. As shown by
previous sector-specific analysis, there is a need for policies and measures to
support investments in the short and in the long run: adapted feed-in tariff for
early renewables, technical and financial assistance for housing renovation, norms
to guide and anchor expectations, appropriate road taxation to increase modal
shift to rail and waterways and so on.
More generally, in addition to the push strategy (put fresh money into an
adapted financial pipeline, target money to selected sectors which are believed to
be of strategic importance), a sound plan should adopt a complementary pull
strategy (attract financing out of the pipeline) through appropriate tax systems,
laws and norms, technical assistance. This section argues that a “Carbon fiscal
shock”—accompanied by appropriate compensation schemes—may not only
attract financing for low carbon investments, but also strongly boost both public
and private investments. By over compensation for a limited period of time (e.g.
5 years), implementation of carbon price (with a tax, an Emission trading scheme
(ETS) or crediting instruments) would be facilitated and over compensation would
provide a short term boost to the European economy, helping to fight against the
risk of deflation.
The point of this scheme is to combine the necessity to get out of the crisis,
i.e. increase activity in order to reduce unemployment swiftly, and to put the EU
economy on the track of a real carbon emissions reduction. A high enough carbon
price (see Box 2) is one of the tools to make carbon emission reduction happens. 
Recent experience has shown that carbon taxes, or carbon prices as in ETS,
may encounter serious opposition. High costs on certain individuals, lock-in in
investments and technologies that imply high cost when switching to low carbon
solutions, direct impact on competitiveness when carbon price is high in one
country but low or inexistent for competitors, a loss of competitiveness which can
also result in carbon leakage and compromise the efficiency of the carbon price.
High level of taxes and degraded balance sheets are in today’s EU another
obstacle to accepting a carbon price, not to say a high one. Positive experience of
carbon price implementation are often obtained through a full policy package
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helping the transition, including decreases in taxes (see World Bank 2014 – State
and trends in carbon pricing).
Full carbon recycling and overcompensation would thus be constituent of the
full policy package making the pricing of carbon more desirable. It is usually
considered that a ramp approach to carbon pricing is more optimal. Slow adapta-
tion is indeed needed due to investment irreversibility and a (slowly) growing
price of carbon help to form sound expectations. The proposal made here takes
the other side of bets by calling for a rapid increase in the carbon price and then a
stabilisation at a rather high level (a stepwise increase in carbon price). What is
lost in time to adapt is gained in credibility and trust in the recycling of carbon
revenue. Nevertheless, because of an operating EU ETS, carbon price increase can
be slower for large firms than for households or scattered CO2 emissions by office
buildings. Over compensation is thus a way to offset the stepwise increase in
carbon. As it can be directed on specific individuals or maybe sectors, it allows
addressing different speed of carbon pricing for different economic agents.
Thus, over compensation is not only justified because it has a positive impact
in the short term on the economy. Over compensation, by making carbon
pricing acceptable and less costly to economic agents, is an investment for the
transition. It is not the type of investment which one spontaneously think of
when referring to an investment plan like the Juncker Plan, but, as it is increasing
the success and the ambition of engaging the economy on a path of lower
carbon emission, it can have more social return than any kind of investment. By
making private or public physical investment in low carbon equipment or infra-
structure more profitable, it provides the shock on the rate of return of capital we
are desperately seeking. Moreover, investing in the possibility of the low carbon
economy is a public investment by nature, i.e. the kind of investment private
sector is not going to finance and for which public debt is justified. We present a
financing scheme for the over compensation, where public debt is a mutualized
debt to participating countries and can be used as a monitoring method for a
cooperative carbon pricing.
This section presents the proposal of a “Carbon fiscal shock” and proposes to
address its negative effects through two measures: a Compensation scheme and a
Carbon tax on imports. A transition fund would allow for carrying public debt
generated in the transition period, debt repaid back on a longer term (e.g.
20 years), back loading the initial stimulus and accompanying policies. A simula-
tion of such an EU wide Carbon fiscal shock is then presented and discussed.
Paris Climate Summit at the end of the year 2015 could be a decisive moment
to launch such an initiative and credibly engage in climate change mitigation and
stagnation threats response.
Proposals
Proposal 1: A stepwise CO2 price increase to boost investment
The core of the proposal is a steady increase in the social price of carbon for
the EU simultaneously, from a low 5 to 10€ presently to a higher 50 to 150€ per
ton of CO2. Instead of a slow ramping in the price of carbon, the price of carbon
would be high initially and would not increase in the future. Later on, it could
even diminish, reflecting then the marginal cost of abatement of CO2. 
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A high initial price would aim at a higher rate of depreciation of capital, a
higher marginal productivity of capital, inducing a loss in capital (whereas
smoothed by some compensation packages) but a boost in private investment. A
social price of carbon would have a similar impact on public investment, and
given that some flexibility is granted to Member States on the calculus of public
deficit, public investment would be a strong driver of the investment boost. 
The social price of carbon can be affected through a minimum price of carbon
on ETS and a tax for non ETS economic units. Public subsidies to green invest-
ment, lowering the cost of capital can be a second option, which may seem more
acceptable, but this option implies rising taxes in order to finance subsidies. It
raises the problem of monitoring and certifying the emission reduction content of
investment. As a (large, depending on sectors) part of emission reduction is
achieved by change in behaviour, investing in the right technology does not
necessarily deliver emission reductions. For that reason, letting the price of carbon
flow from the easily accountable sources (fossil fuels, concrete, fertilizers
consumption) to the final prices is appealing.
Addressing negative effects
A high carbon price would have negative effects that have to be considered,
mainly through 3 channels: 1. loss of consumption by high carbon emitters
among households. High carbon emitters may be poor households with low
possibility of substitution because energy is a primary good and because choices
made by households forbid rapid adaptation to a large shift in relative prices. 2.
The same effect arises for producers who cannot shift rapidly (or without depreci-
ating a large quantity of capital) on their production function when facing a
change in relative prices. The high carbon price would have a strong negative
impact on their balance sheet or on their ability to operate their business. The irre-
versibility of investment (as in the case of households) is the cause of the loss
occurred. 3. A general loss of competitiveness generated by a higher cost of
energy in the EU compared to the cost of energy in other parts of the world where
such a carbon price wouldn’t be implemented. That effect could be even stronger
if energy efficiency is improved in Europe and global energy demand is reduced as
a result. Carbon leakage, through the localisation of carbon emitting industrial
processes where they are less priced or taxed could result in an overall increase of
global carbon emissions and jobs destruction in “virtuous” countries.
Those 3 channels could be mitigated by a compensation scheme for house-
holds, a reconversion and compensation fund for firms and a carbon tax on Euro
area (or EU) imports. 
Box 2. How to estimate a monetary price for carbon?
The concept of a carbon tax is coming from the theoretical concept proposed
by the economist Pigou to address market failures and consists in levying a tax
on the goods that impose spill over costs on society which are not supported
by the externality’s source. Then adding a tax allows through private markets
reflecting the social cost in a cost-effective way. Climate change has been iden-
tified as a bad externality to the society by shaping the world in a less
welcoming way and is directly linked to greenhouse gases emissions stemming
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from our fossil fuels consumption. If there is a large consensus on taxing carbon
dioxide to reduce GHG emissions, there is still a debate on its socially optimal
price. The externality there is quite difficult to clearly identify and estimate.
Even if there is strong scientific evidence on the nature of phenomenon, there
is still an uncertainty on its magnitude. 
Giving a price to the carbon emitted today strongly depends on expected
future damage. Evaluating this damage in monetary terms requires estimating
different parameters. A various academic literature attempts to tackle this task
by proposing estimations for a Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). Using the
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) RICE (Regional Integrated Climate-
Economy), W. Nordhaus proposed a set of different estimates (Nordhaus,
2011) for SCC and found for the year 2015 an average SCC of 43.57 $2005
associated with a standard deviation (SD) of 19.35 $2005. Some meta analyses
have been conducted and Havranek & Zilberman (2014) found range of esti-
mates that is from 0-130 $2010 per ton of CO2 (tCO2) whereas Tol (2013) found
a mean estimate of $2010196/tCO2 with a standard deviation of $2010 322 /
tCO2 in its review of 600 estimates. 
Empirical experiences have been put in place unilaterally or regionally by some
countries to price carbon and there is some evidence of relatively high carbon
price. For instance the Swedish carbon tax is up to $ 168/tCO2 and the Tokyo
Cap-and-Trade carbon price reaches $ 95/tCO2 (World Bank, 2014). However
the majority of prices in existing systems lie below $ 35/ tCO2. A recent study of
the IMF (Parry et al., 2014) calculates for the top twenty countries how much
would be the price of CO2 emissions by only taking into account the domestic
co-benefits from reducing other bad externalities such as local pollution, health
harms and transport congestions and the authors found an average, a nationally
efficient price of $ 57.5 / tCO2. In the Deep Decarbonisation report (SDSN &
IDDRI, 2014), the authors proposed, at least for France, a carbon price trajec-
tory, initially formulated by the Quinet commission31 and which is compatible
with the objectives of 75% emissions reduction by 2050 starting at EUR2008 32/
tCO2 in 2010, EUR2008 56/tCO2 in 2020 and EUR2008 100/tCO2 in 2030.
Proposal 2: Compensation scheme and full recycling of carbon revenue
Financing of the compensation would use partly carbon tax or price revenue
directly. Part of that compensation could be permanent or long term in order to
accommodate with specific situations with high irreversibility in the choices made
under the no carbon price system of relative prices. The rest of the carbon revenue
would be directed to general taxes or social contributions reduction, allowing for
a shift of taxation from labour to environment tax. But the core of the proposal is
that for a temporary period of time, (e.g. 5 years), compensation schemes would
be superior to the carbon revenue.
The compensation scheme for households could consist of a general tax
reform, a special fund for high energy consumers, low price or free non-transfer-
able fuel allowances, and an investment/third party fund for retrofitting building
with subsidies for retrofitting costs. Again, compensation can be designed as to
initially overshoot the implied costs in order to boost households’ income and to
limit the number of losers and the extent of their loses. 
31. La valeur tutélaire du carbone, Centre d’Analyse Stratégique (2009).
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Compensation for firms can be based on sectors. For instance, high energy
consumers but already efficient could have access to free of tax energy or benefit
from grandfathering in the ETS (Emissions Trading System). The investment fund
could be reconverted in order to reduce the cost of investment or to provide
financing even to firms lacking access to financial markets because of deterio-
rated balance sheets. Energy efficiency investment could thus be separated from
any other investment.
A more ambitious approach could be based on a general tax reform. By rede-
fining the goals and the principles of taxation, by shifting taxation from some
bases to others, the implementation of a carbon price and tax could be made
more easily accepted. Over compensation, temporary in nature, can’t be a
permanent funding of a decrease in tax rates. But, reallocation of public
spending, extra revenue from the boost on the economy, benefits from the
recovery and automatic stabilizers redesign when back to normal could provide
room for fiscal reform.
Proposal 3: Over compensation
Over compensation is necessary as a temporary policy to increase the
acceptability of setting a price on carbon. The benefit of over compensating the
cost of the carbon price would be two fold.
First, it is a response to previous failed attempt to implement in some coun-
tries a carbon price and would allow for an ambitious value for carbon. The
experience of Swedish carbon price (implemented in 1991 at 27$/t, increased in
2004 to 100$/t and presently over 150$/tCO2) is that a high price can be easily
accepted when overall taxation is significantly reduced. Let us stress that a steep
increase is also preferable (as in Sweden from 2000 to 2004) because it provides a
guarantee to households and firms that the proposed deal (less general taxes
against more environment taxes) is not going to be modified in the future.
Second, it would be a boost to the EU economy and a way to bypass the
framework of treaties. For a 100€/t increase in carbon price, representing roughly
1.5% of GDP, the over compensation could amount to 0.5 to 1% of GDP and
would be decreasing over 5 years. The total amount, from 1.4% of GDP to 3% of
GDP, would be financed by a Transition fund, equivalent to European debt repaid
through member states contributions over a period to define (with an order of
magnitude of 20y). That financing channel would be similar in design to the Euro-
pean Social Fund, FEM or FEDER, except for the ability to bear debt. Repayment of
the debt would be budgeted in the Budget of the European Budget. A more
restricted fund, limited to euro area countries or even to a subset, implying a
smaller funding (reduced to 60% if limited to euro area) could be an alternative,
based on the enhanced cooperation procedure (or even open method of coordi-
nation). The flow of payment would have to be implemented from contributions
of participating members to the fund. Such a fund would be close in spirit to the
polish proposal of a European Investment Fund, able to raise debt. 
Transition fund debt would not be accounted as public debt (as proposed in
the Juncker Plan for member states participation to the European Fund for Stra-
tegic Investment32), in order to bypass the constraints of the TSCG and debt rules.
32. Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry make a similar proposition in their 2014 Reforms, Investment, and
Growth report, an agenda for France, Germany and Europe. http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/
files/PDF/rapport_enderlein_pisani-en.pdf
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1.6% nominal interest rate over 20 years would imply from 12 to 30b€/year, and
at the level of the EU would necessitate an initial debt of 240b€ to 510b€. Partici-
pating Member states would be allowed to use the fund up to their share in the
fund in order to finance the over compensation of the carbon price introduction.
Monitoring of the overall process would be a condition for the funding and the
fund would therefore act as a controlling institution.
Proposal 4: Carbon tax on imports
The last point of the proposal is a carbon tax on (extra EU, extra participating
members) imports and a negative tax (subsidy) on export. Such a taxing scheme
is to be thought as similar to VAT (see Laurent & Le Cacheux (2009) for a discus-
sion). The import tax could be based on average estimates of carbon content of
imported products unless the importer can provide evidence of a lower import
content. The product of the carbon tax on import would be used for funding
investment program in emerging countries, answering actively by this way to the
protectionism accusation. Any country engaging into a carbon tax or carbon price
scheme would be exempted of the carbon tax on imports. The Carbon revenue
distribution and the exemption could be powerful tools for climate negotiation.
Taxing imports and neutralizing on export prices the impact of carbon price
scheme inside the EU is an important objective. It allows for a specific timing of
carbon pricing in Europe, one core element of the Carbon Fiscal Shock discussed
here. Stepwise carbon pricing is justified for political reasons (improving credi-
bility of the price path and the compensation package) and economic ones
(boosting the EU economy to escape the deflation or stagnation trap). Carbon
leakage and competiveness issues can destroy the political momentum of carbon
price and climate change mitigation. Even if an international agreement can be
expected in the medium term, and even if, in the medium term, carbon price can
be hoped to be global, different national price paths are the rule. Moreover,
details in the implementation of the carbon pricing scheme, addressing competi-
tiveness and carbon leakage issues can complicate the interactions of different
national carbon price systems. Facing this reality, border taxation of carbon
appears as a necessary tool.
Box 3. Literature review on carbon leakage and boarder 
tax adjustments
The issue of Carbon leakage has been addressed mainly with the creation of
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Boarder Tax Adjustment seems to be an
optimal policy to fight against carbon leakage and the existence of “pollution
havens”. However its international acceptance has not been yet fully estab-
lished and its legality within the current international trade rules is still in
debate since it aims to regulate activities undertaken abroad EU. Some criticism
arose to argue on the protectionist aspects of such a mechanism. This question
is conceptually rather difficult to address since it is seeking to compare a coun-
terfactual scenario (no introduction of carbon policy) with the observed data.
Different approaches have been used to estimate the carbon leakage effects;
the first one is based on the use of theoretical model, in general or partial equi-
librium which is calibrated with existing data. Winchester, Paltsev, & Reilly
(2011), Fischer & Fox (2012), Demailly & Quirion (2006), Burniaux, Chateau,
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& Duval (2013) and Monjon & Quirion (2010) used this method to estimate
the effect of implementing BCA on emissions and output and Branger &
Quirion (2013)conducted a meta-analysis on this topic. The other method-
ology relies on ex-post empirical evidence to provide econometric estimates —
this branch of the literature observes a significant carbon leakage. Aichele &
Felbermayr (2011), Baier & Bergstrand (2009) or Ederington & Minier (2003)
in particular conducted empirical studies on this issue. 
More generally, four mechanisms relating to carbon leakage have been iden-
tified. The first three are negatively oriented and has been proposed by Reinaud
(2008):
— The short-term competitiveness channel: the increase in price leads to a
reduction in the market share of the constrained industries to the benefit of
unconstrained competitors.
— The Investment channel: a unilateral mitigation action provides incentives
to firms to direct capital towards countries with less stringent policies.
— The fossil fuel price channel: It can be approximate by the “rebound
effect”; energy demand reduction conduct to a decrease of global energy
prices which ultimately triggers higher energy demand elsewhere.
A fourth channel has been identified by Dröge, Wang, & Grubb (2009) and is
linked to positive technological spill-overs: it relies on the idea that the increase
in the price of energy spurred by a more stringent climate policy could stimulate
technological progress, which in the end, improves the competitiveness of firms.
How to implement it in the European framework?
The right level of application of a carbon price is the EU. The EU ETS has been
operational and functioning for years and backed by a strong experience. Back
loading and the reserve mechanism (IDDRI, 2014) provide tool to step up carbon
price and even control carbon price.33 Moreover, implementing a border carbon
tax inside EU may be heading in a direction which is not to be whished.
Deploying a high carbon price beyond ETS could be fostered at the EU level
and backed European institutions. The transition fund would then be companion
tool that the Commission could operate, based on its knowledge and competence
of those subjects. Coordination with other funds (in particular EFSI, the Juncker
Fund) would thus be accomplished smoothly.
Enhanced cooperation could be another level of organisation if time or polit-
ical will is missing to implement an EU wide ambition. EU ETS operation and other
instrument for carbon pricing could be dissociated (in timing) and a sub set of
willing countries could engage in the Fiscal Carbon Shock, implement the transi-
tion fund (and the corresponding back loading debt). The implementation of the
carbon border tax would be more difficult and could be approximated by
compensation devices at a cost in term of readability and efficiency.
33. Currently, the logic of ETS is to give a price resulting from quantities of emission reduction
targets. This guarantees a cost effective pricing of carbon under quantity constraints. Having CO2
emissions resulting from a pre-determined carbon price constitute a different approach. Flexible and
adaptive targets for emissions reductions achieved may end in convergence of the two logics.
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Simulation
In this section we assess a policy package that combines a carbon tax of
€100/tCO2 with fiscal stimulus in Europe. The carbon tax is introduced in 2015
and held constant in real terms; its revenues are recycled such that there is an
overall positive stimulus (starting at 50% of revenues and reducing over time) to
Europe’s economies. The revenue recycling takes the form of reductions in
income taxes, subsidies to energy-intensive firms and public investment in
energy efficiency.
The E3ME macro-econometric simulation model from Cambridge Economet-
rics was used to carry out the assessment. E3ME does not assume full employment
or optimal use of economic resources, meaning it is well-suited to modelling
Europe’s economies post-recession and the potential effects of fiscal stimulus.
The modelling finds that there could be short-term economic benefits from
the policy package, of up to 1.4% of GDP. One should note that this results from
a particularly large estimate of the double dividend to be expected from invest-
ment in the energy transition. Simulations made with the ThreeME model,
although demonstrating similar impacts on economic activity, are comparatively
smaller in magnitude (see Box 4).
In the E3ME simulation, employment could also increase by up to 0.6% in this
period. There are positive economic impacts in all EU Member States, but some of
the largest benefits are in countries that currently have high unemployment rates.
The modelling also finds that there are longer-term macroeconomic benefits.
These benefits are smaller than the short-term impacts and are driven by reduc-
tions in fuel imports to Europe. Employment increases in the long run as there is
some switching from energy-intensive to labour-intensive activities. 
The long-run modelling does not factor in the higher levels of debt that are
taken on at European level; these would need to be paid back at some point in the
future and could reduce GDP growth at this time. However, as Europe’s econo-
mies would still benefit from reduced fuel imports, it is reasonable to assume that,
over the projection period as a whole, results would be positive. 
CO2 emissions fall by around 14% as a result of the carbon tax and energy
efficiency measures. This reduction would put Europe close to being on track to
meet its 2030 emissions target.
The policy scenario
The policy scenario is decomposed in four sub scenarios. They are:
• S1 – A pan-European carbon tax. The carbon tax is introduced at a rate of
€100/tCO2 in 2015 and maintained in real terms over the projection
period. It is applied to energy-related and process emissions across all
sectors and replaces the EU ETS (including any revenues generated from
auctioned allowances to the power sector).
• S2 – The carbon tax plus revenue recycling to households and industry.
This scenario includes the same carbon tax as S1 but also includes revenue
recycling to households in the form of lower income tax rates (70% of the
revenues) and to industry in the form of lump-sum subsidies (25% of the
revenues). In addition, there is a short-term over-recycling of revenues,
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starting with a 50% boost in 2015, gradually declining to zero over a five-
year period (Table 2).
• S3 – The carbon tax plus revenue recycling in S2 and investment in energy
efficiency. In this scenario the final 5% of revenues is used to invest in
household energy efficiency measures. We apply a coefficient derived from
the IEA’s World Energy Outlook to estimate additional energy savings. We
assume that all the efficiency measures lead to reductions in household use
of energy, principally gas but also electricity and heating oil. As in S2, there
is a short-term over-compensation of revenues.
• S4 – Carbon tax, revenue recycling and BTAs. In addition to the measures in
S3, in S4 we introduce Border Tax Adjustments on imports of the ‘Big 6’
energy-intensive industries (pulp & paper, refining, basic inorganic chemi-
cals, cement and lime, iron and steel, aluminium). The revenues from these
BTAs are assumed to be used to finance low-carbon development outside
the EU and do not benefit the domestic economy.
Basic modelling approach
E3ME is a simulation model based on a post-Keynesian approach. Unlike the
more common Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling approach,
E3ME does not assume optimisation and full utilisation of economic capacity,
hence allowing for underemployment.
These features make the model a suitable tool for evaluating fiscal stimulus. By
acknowledging that Europe’s economies are suffering from a shortage of aggre-
gate demand, the model can be used to estimate the effects of various measures
to boost domestic consumption. The method of stimulus here (borrowing at
European level to finance national spending) has some resemblance to a European
programme of quantitative easing (QE). However, QE would be very unlikely to
include the same targeting of spending.
Further information about the E3ME model may be found on the model
website.34
Table 2. How the carbon tax revenues are allocated, %
Scen 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
S2 Households 105.0 98.0 91.0 84.0 77.0 70.0
Industry 37.5 35.0 32.5 30.0 27.5 25.0
Energy efficiency 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 142.5 133.0 123.5 114.0 104.5 95.0
S3-4 Households 105.0 98.0 91.0 84.0 77.0 70.0
Industry 37.5 35.0 32.5 30.0 27.5 25.0
Energy efficiency 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0
Total 150.0 140.0 130.0 120.0 110.0 100.0
Source: Eurostat.
34. http://www.e3me.com
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The carbon tax is entered as an additional tax on fuel consumption, with the
rate depending on the fuels’ carbon contents. It is assumed that the electricity
sector passes on its costs in full but other sectors may be restricted from doing so
by international competition; if this is the case then they will likely suffer a loss of
profitability.
It is assumed that the revenues are recycled by national administrations and
there are no cross-border transfers (apart from the BTA revenues, see below). As
the EU’s Member States already have excise duties on fuels it is assumed that
there is no increase in transaction costs and all the additional revenues are avail-
able for recycling.
The policy scenario suggests that the over-recycling of revenues comes from a
central European fund and is therefore not included in national balance sheets. It
follows that we have an assumption that there is no direct crowding out of
economic activity and the stimulus is additional to everything else that is going on
in the economy. There may, however, be indirect crowding out, for example if
Member States started reaching full employment or sectors reached their produc-
tion capacity; this effect is captured by the model’s equations but, given current
growth rates, it seems rather unlikely that output will reach capacity levels.
The BTAs are modelled as an increase in import prices. The rate of the price
increase is determined by the carbon intensity of EU production and EU carbon
prices; this is added as a tax on imports of the specified products from outside
the EU.
Realistically, BTAs are only likely to be applied to a few selected products. In
our analysis we have expanded these products to cover the entire NACE 2-digit
parent sectors; even so, these sectors contribute a small share of total GVA in
Europe so we would not expect large economic impacts from this measure.
The aim of the BTAs therefore is not to improve macroeconomic results but to
offer protection to the specific EU industries that are exposed to competitiveness
issues and ‘carbon leakage’.
Macroeconomic impacts
Figure 5 shows the impacts of the full policy package on GDP (S4 compared
to baseline, over compensation break down). There is an immediate stimulus
effect worth about 1.1% of GDP, which increases up to 2017, reaching around
1.4% of GDP. Beyond 2017, the stimulus effect tails off, and GDP is around 0.8%
higher than in the baseline beyond 2020. 
The stimulus is financed by borrowing at the European level. In this scenario,
it would remain as an outstanding debt as we have not included a repayment
mechanism. However, even if the debt was repaid later in the projection period
we could still expect to see a small long-term positive effect due to the restruc-
turing that arises from the carbon tax and energy-efficiency measures.
Employment increases by around 0.6% (short run) and 0.3% (long run)
compared to the baseline, following a similar pattern over time to GDP. According
to our results, the policy package thus stimulates both higher levels of economic
activity and employment.
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Table 3 shows the evolution of key macroeconomic indicators over the projec-
tion period. The pattern is one of increased consumption by households (due to
the lower income taxes) and increased investment (primarily in energy-efficient
equipment). Trade effects are quite limited in scope, although for imports this
outcome represents a combination of lower fuel imports and higher imports of
consumer goods (see below). Inflation increases, with the price level about 2%
higher in S4 than in the baseline. It would therefore be important to ensure that
low-income households are compensated for higher electricity and fuel prices.
The GDP impacts are positive throughout the projection period. In the short
term, there is a stimulus effect from the over-recycling of revenues. This stimulus is
only effective because there are unused economic resources across Europe in the
projection period; if Europe’s economies were already operating at full capacity,
inflation would likely be the result, rather than an increase in real activity.
Figure 5. EU28 GDP
 S4, in % difference from baseline 
Sources: Cambridge Econometrics, E3ME Model.
Table 3. EU28 summary of results
S4, in % difference from baseline
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025
GDP 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.8
Consumption 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.0
Investment 2.9 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.1
Exports -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Imports 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0
Price index 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.9
Employment 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3
Source: E3ME Model.
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However, the modelling results also show long-term benefits. These are due to
some of the structural shifts that occur in the scenario. There are two main ones:
• There is a positive effect on Europe’s trade balance from the reduced fuel
imports—fuel consumption falls as a result of both the carbon price (S1)
and the energy-efficiency measures (S3). A large share of the savings in
imported fuels is spent on goods that are, at least in part, produced domes-
tically. This boosts domestic production levels. 
• There is a transfer from businesses to households—a large share of the
carbon tax is paid by business, more than the 25% of revenues that is recy-
cled back to industry. Some sectors, such as electricity generation, can pass
these costs on to final consumers but others are unable to pass costs on,
due to foreign competition. Lower profits in these sectors are matched by
higher real household incomes. As households have lower savings rates and
higher domestic consumption rates than businesses (e.g. multinationals’
profits may flow abroad), this creates more activity within Europe.
Table 4 shows the results for each scenario in 2020, which corresponds to
the end of the initial stimulus (although there are still some lagged benefits at
this time). In most cases the results are quite intuitive; the carbon tax reduces
GDP by 0.7% and imports fall by even more in S1. However, the effects of the
revenue recycling, including the stimulus, make these impacts positive overall in
the other scenarios.
The BTAs have a limited impact on the economy as a whole. This is because
the revenues from the BTAs are not spent within Europe but are instead assumed
to be provided to developing countries to finance low-carbon measures. The
effects of the BTA thus become a trade-off between import substitution and
higher prices for final consumers. These effects very nearly cancel out overall.
Household spending is the largest component of GDP and is an important
driver of the overall results. In S1, household spending falls due to the higher
prices and a loss of real income, but lower income taxes result in higher spending
in the other scenarios. Investment also tends to track GDP in these results but
there is additional stimulus to investment through the energy-efficiency measures
in S3 and S4.
Table 4. EU 28 summary of results, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
GDP -0.7 0.9 1.1 1.1
Consumer expenditure -1.5 1.2 1.4 1.3
Investment -0.3 0.7 1.4 1.4
Extra-EU Exports -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
Extra-EU Imports -1.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
Price index 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1
Employment -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Source: E3ME Model.
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Box 4. ThreeME versus E3ME, the French case
Simulations were conducted through two models in this report one at the
European scale with the E3ME model (Cambridge Econometrics) and another
one for France with the ThreeME model (OFCE). Even if both models highlight a
positive impact of the carbon fiscal shock plan on the output, the magnitude in
the results is quite different. Beyond the fact that each model has its own prop-
erties, the question of the scale and the existence of spill over effects across
countries matters in the results. The ThreeME model has been developed in the
framework of a research convention between OFCE and the French Environ-
mental Agency (ADEME). It is a neo-keynesian Computable General Model
(CGE) that exhibits features like stickiness in the adjustments processes of prices
and quantities or a representation of the labour market through a Phillips curve
which allows taking into account a dynamic dimension in its results. Its multi-
sectorial structure in 37 sectors, in which 17 are only energy production activi-
ties leads to take into account the possible structural changes in the economy
and then lead to a more accurate analysis.
Beyond the question of the positive effect of an investment plan, the question
remains whether there is the possibility for an environmental tax to lead to struc-
tural positive effect on the economy. The existence of the double-dividend has
been since its formulation by Pearce (1991) discussed and even challenged on its
theoretical foundations. Some theoretical articles found a loss of welfare, either
through a suboptimal emissions reduction (Bovenberg & de Mooij,1994), a loss
of income (Van de Bovenberg,1994) or a reduction of employment (Bovenberg,
Goulder & Jacobsen, 2008). Paradoxically, empirical studies, which were mainly
using CGE models to assess the impact of the introduction of a carbon tax
observed a positive double-dividend. Takeda (1997) found for instance that for
the Japan economy a strong double-dividend arises when recycling of revenues
is associated with capital tax reduction. Fraser & Waschik (2013) got the same
results for the Australian economy with several mechanism designs. 
Figure 6. French GDP, Carbon Fiscal Shock simulation using ThreeME
       In % deviation from baseline
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, E3ME Model.
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Even if the theoretical framework is not shared by all the articles on the
double-dividend question, the main argument that can explain this difference
in the results is that contrarily to empirical studies that take into account of
some realities, the theoretical articles take as granted the optimality of the
economy as a benchmark. Although environmental taxes appear to be less
distortionary than pre-existing taxes, which in the end justifies this positive
effect. 
There are no policies designed to address employment directly, so the
employment impacts are the result of changes in levels of economic activity.
There is also some shift from energy-intensive to labour-intensive activities. In this
analysis we have not considered whether Europe’s labour markets would be able
to provide the right skills to take up these additional jobs. However, from the
sectorial results discussed below, we can see that the additional jobs would fall
broadly into two categories: fairly low-skilled jobs in consumer services and more
specialised positions in installing energy-efficient products. Policy makers may
need to consider whether adequate training is provided for the latter case.
Impacts across Europe
Figure 7 shows that the GDP impacts are positive in all Member States in
2020. They are all positive and range from 0.3% in the UK to 3.6% in Cyprus.
Figure 7. S4 GDP by region, 2020
   In % difference from baseline
Source: E3ME Model.
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There are various reasons for the differences across regions. Most notably, as
the stimulus is a proportion of the carbon tax revenues, regions with higher
carbon intensity get a larger stimulus. This is the result of a fairly arbitrary assump-
tion that has been made in the modelling exercise, but explains why countries like
the UK, France and Sweden see smaller impacts.
Another issue is that the countries with the most capacity available (e.g. high
unemployment rates) are likely to gain more from the stimulus. In many cases
these are also the more energy-intensive countries so the effects are stronger in
these countries overall.
Other possible reasons for variation in outcomes include industry cost pass-
through rates, household savings ratios, the share of international trade and the
flexibility of labour markets. There can also be strong interactions between
Member States due to their trade linkages.
Impacts on key sectors
Almost all sectors benefit from the measures. The ones that see the largest
increases in output and employment are those that supply consumer services and
those that produce/install energy-efficient products.
The sectors that lose out are the energy extraction and utilities sectors. 
Table 5 shows the impact on energy-intensive industries’ (EII) output in 2020.
As expected, the carbon tax has a negative impact on most EIIs (S1). Chemicals
and non-metallic minerals appear the hardest hit. In the second scenario (S2)
some EIIs benefit from the increase in economic activity resulting from the
compensation of households and industry. The Non-metallic minerals and Basic
metals sectors particularly benefit from the introduction of energy-efficiency
measures, as they are part of the supply chain for energy-efficient investment
goods (S3). 
Figure 8. EU28 Output by sector, 2020
                               In % difference from baseline
Source: E3ME Model.
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Non-metallic minerals benefit the most from the border tax adjustments (S4).
In general, however, the BTAs have only a small impact on domestic production,
even in the EIIs. This is partly a short-run effect as most existing plants will still be
open and producing in 2020, regardless of import prices. Decisions on relocation
of plants may frame the longer-term outcomes in these sectors but this would
require a more detailed sectorial analysis. 
Environmental impacts
Figure 8 shows the impact on emissions levels in all four scenarios. Overall we
see a reduction in emissions of around 14%.
By far the largest reduction in emissions comes from the carbon tax in S1. S2
sees some rebound, due to the higher levels of economic activity but there is a
further reduction in emissions due to the energy-efficiency measures that are
introduced in S3. The BTAs have only a small impact on emissions levels, due to
the small changes in output that they cause.
Table 5. EU28 Output by energy-intensive sectors, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
Paper & paper products -1.1 0.6 0.9 0.9
Manufactured fuels -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals -1.4 -0.1 0.2 0.2
Non-metallic minerals -1.6 -0.3 0.4 0.7
Basic metals -0.3 1.4 1.8 1.9
Source: E3ME Model.
Figure 9. EU28 CO2 emissions by scenario, 
    In % difference from baseline
Sources: iAGS, E3ME Model.
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As the carbon tax is imposed on all sectors, direct emissions fall across the
whole economy. Power generation makes the largest contribution in absolute
terms and the results show some increase in renewables by 2020.
Emissions from households are also reduced by the energy-efficiency meas-
ures, which reduce domestic consumption of gas.
Table 7 shows the reduction in consumption of each fuel. Again, all fossil fuels
are affected. Consumption of gas is reduced by the energy-efficiency measures in
S3 as well as the carbon tax.
Table 6. EU28 CO2 emissions by fuel user, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
1   Power generation -20.5 -19.8 -17.9 -17.9
2   Rest of energy branch -12.7 -12.6 -13.0 -13.0
3   Iron & steel          -16.3 -15.9 -15.8 -15.8
4   Non-ferrous metals    -13.6 -12.7 -12.4 -12.5
5   Chemicals             -9.4 -9.6 -9.6 -9.6
6   Non-metallic minerals    -14.8 -14.3 -14.0 -13.9
7   Ore-extraction -21.3 -21.1 -20.9 -21.0
8   Food, drink & tobacco  -13.4 -12.8 -12.7 -12.7
9   Textiles, clothing & footwear -17.0 -16.5 -16.5 -16.5
10 Paper & pulp         -12.5 -12.0 -11.8 -11.8
11 Engineering etc.      -17.2 -16.5 -16.3 -16.3
12 Other industry       -13.3 -12.8 -12.7 -12.8
13 Construction         -20.9 -20.5 -19.8 -19.9
14 Rail transport       -4.6 -4.5 -4.5 -4.6
15 Road transport       -10.3 -9.7 -9.6 -9.9
16 Air transport        -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8
17 Other transport services -10.1 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0
18 Households           -11.7 -11.1 -27.1 -27.1
19 Agriculture, forestry -28.9 -28.9 -28.8 -28.9
20 Fishing              -4.1 -4.0 -4.0 -4.1
21 Other final use      -13.3 -11.8 -11.4 -11.5
22 Non-energy use       -1.1 0.1 0.6 0.7
Sources: E3ME.
Table 7.  EU28 CO2 emissions by fuel type, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
Coal -21.3 -20.7 -20.6 -20.6
Liquid fuels       -8.1 -7.5 -7.4 -7.6
Gas        -7.9 -7.2 -9.6 -9.6
Sources: E3ME.
